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THE CONSTITUTION AND

ENCRYPTION REGULATION:
DO WE NEED A "NEW PRIVACY"?
A. Michael Froomkin*
The regulation of cryptography is an issue that I personally believe is of great importance to our lives. I hope to persuade you over
the next quarter hour that it will become increasingly important. I
want to start, however, by briefly sketching the state of play regarding
the legal and constitutional regulation of encryption, and then talk
about the somewhat more speculative issues that really concern me the
most.
The state of play right now is fairly simple. If you want to use
encryption domestically to encrypt a stored file or a real-time communication, you can do so. Because this is peace time, there are, as has
always been the case in this country in peace time, no limits whatsoever on your ability to use encryption technology-no legal limits, at
any rate. There are export controls enforced for various kinds of cryptography that make it illegal to export various strong encryption products without a license. There are also certain categories of products
for which certain categories of people do not and will not get licenses.
Those export control policies are being challenged in three court
cases: Bernstein v. United States Departmentof Justice,' a California
case, Karnz v. United States Department of State,2 a case out of Wash* @ A. Michael Froomkin 1999. Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
Internet froomkin@law.tm. I have taken the liberty of tidying up the transcript of

my talk, and breaking up or, on rare occasions, reorganizing sentences for clarity, but
the text otherwise reflects my actual remarks. I have also added notes where I thought
references might interest the reader or where there have been important developments
since I delivered the talk on November 19, 1998. Permission is granted to reproduce
for non-commercial purposes so long as this copyright notice is included.
1. 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn pending rehearingen banc,
F.3d
(1999), availablein No. 97-16686, 1999 WL 782073 (9th Cir. Sept. 30,
1999). Briefs and information on the progress of the case are available at Challenging
U.S. Export Controls on Enciyption: Background to Bernstein r. U.S. Department of
Justice, ELcTcRoNic FRoNTmR FoUNA r N (visited Oct. 17, 1999) <httpl'./www.eff.
org/pub/Legal/Cases/Bernstein_v_DoJ/>.
2. 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), remanded by, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Briefs and information on the progress of the case are available at The Applied Crp-

25
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ington, D.C., and Junger v. Daley,3 an Ohio case. The Bernstein case
was decided in favor of an academic who wanted a declaration that he
could legally post source code from his Ph.D. dissertation on the Internet, 4 which under current law would result in an "export." Bernstein won in the district court, and the court said that source code is
protected speech. 5 That decision was taken on expedited appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, where it has languished for many, many months, verging on almost a year. 6 Maybe they are waiting for it to become moot,
I do not know. Meanwhile, over in the D.C. district court, the cognate
case, known as the Karn case, was decided against the person wishing
to export encryption technology, 7 in what I have to say is one of the
worst written decisions I have ever seen. You might agree with the
bottom line, but the rationale, in which the court stated that this was a
political question,8 was, to my mind, extraordinarily unconvincing.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated it as moot because the regulations
had changed; 9 so, the case went back to district court in front of a new
judge, the original judge unfortunately having died in the interim, and,
there it remains waiting to be decided.
Meanwhile, on the regulatory side, the major statute that provides
the legal underpinning for the export control rules lapsed. Congress
had put in a sunset provision in the Export Administration Act and did
not renew the statute when it lapsed.' 0 You would think, perhaps, that
tography Case: Only Americans Can Type (visited Oct. 17, 1999) <http://people.
qualcomm.com/karn/export/index.html>.
3. 8 F. Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that export of encryption software
is not expressive enough to merit First Amendment protection). The Junger case is
currently being appealed. Briefs and information on the progress of the case are available at Junger v. Daley (visited Oct. 17, 1999) <http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/complaw/jvd/>.
4. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1147.
5. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D.
Cal. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132
(9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn pending rehearingen banc, F.3d (1999),
available in No. 97-16686, 1999 WL 782073 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 1999).
6. The expedited appeal was ordered on Sept. 22, 1997; oral argument was heard
in December 1997. The Ninth Circuit ultimately issued its opinion on May 6, 1999.
See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1132. As of this issue going to press, the United States had
been granted a rehearing en banc. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, No.
97-16686 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 1999) (order granting rehearing en banc) (copy on file
with author).
7. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 3.
8. See id. at 6.
9. See Karn v. United States Dep't of State, No. 96-5121, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
3123, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1997) (per curiam).
10. The statutory authority for Export Administration Regulations (EAR) is the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1994). See 15 C.F.R.
§ 730.2 (1999) ("The EAR have been designed primarily to implement the Export
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the rules which grew out of it would have lapsed as well. They did
not. President Clinton signed an emergency order (as I might add,
many of his predecessors had done when earlier versions of the law
had lapsed for shorter periods of time) saying that the rules needed to
be kept in force, and he has signed an extension of that order every six
months.11 It is only slightly cruel and barely unfair to say that the
national emergency, which is being cited as a justification for keeping
this statute in place, is that Congress has refused to pass a new bill.
2
Some of us are very concerned about this.'
This is perhaps my main point for you today. Although the cases
in the courts deal with the constitutionality of export controls, for my
money, what really matters are the domestic rules and the domestic
effects of the export control rules: export controls being used as a tool
to try to limit the options available to Americans in practical terms.
This was not the original intent of those statutes, and it is probably not
the way they ought to be used. The emergency is being used in a way
that I think is more appropriate for a banana republic than for a strong
constitutional democracy. If Congress does not choose to re-pass a
bill that it sunsetted, that failure to act ought to have some consequences. When it does not, the nature and quality of our democracy is
undermined.
Now we are seeing proposals in Congress-and I am referring
specifically to one of the bills mentioned in the materials handed out
today,13-bills which are endorsed by the FBI as being the closest to
giving them what they want. These would impose rather strong controls on the type of encryption that could legally be sold or distributed
"). The Export Administration Act of 1979 lapsed on
August 20, 1994. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (1994). President Clinton issued an
executive order requiring that the Export Administration Act be kept in force to "the
extent permitted by law" under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994). Exec. Order No. 12,924, 3 C.F.R. 918
(1994), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
11. The Export Administration Act expired on August 20, 1994. See U.S.C. § 2419
(1994). Exec. Order No. 12,924 of August 19, 1994, 3 C.F.R. 918 (1994), extended
by the Presidential Notices of August 15, 1995, 3 C.F.R. 501 (1995); August 14,
1996, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1996); August 13, 1997, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1997); and August 13,
1998, 3 C.F.R. 294 (1998), continued almost all of the Export Administration Regulations in effect under the IEEPA.
12. See A. Michael Froomldn, It Came From Planet Clipper, 1996 U. C. LEGAL
F. 15, 71-75, availablein <http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articlesfplanet-clipper.htm> [hereinafter Froomkin, Planet Clipper].
13. See H.&. 695 - The "SAFE" Bill, Amendinent to H.R. 695 Offered by Mr. Oxey
of Ohio, CENTER FOR DE.iocRAcy AND TECHNOLOG (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <http.//
www.cdt.org/crypto/legis.105/SAFE/Oxley..Manton-rev.html> (referred to as Oxley/
Manton Amendment to Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) bill).

Administration Act of 1979 ....

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 3:25

to American citizens; they are de facto, broad, encryption controls in
America. We have reason to be concerned about these proposals, and
I want to talk about these reasons.
But before I do that, let me play lawyer for just a couple of minutes and talk to you about this wonderful document which I came
upon just a couple of days ago: the Department of Justice FAQ (frequently asked questions) on encryption. 1 4 This is, by the way, I think,
an example of first-class public service. It is really clear, it is written
in terms that make the policies accessible and understandable, and it
does a good job of advocating for its cause. The fact that I am going
to beat up on it a bit, because I disagree with it, should not in any way
be taken to suggest anything but my admiration for the quality of the
work, because I really think they do a public service in government
when they clearly state what it is they are about. We should all be
grateful for that.
So here it is. The Department of Justice FAQ on encryption policy, issued and dated November 16, 1998, just a couple of days ago,
says that:
The Framers of our Constitution determined that individuals would
not have an absolute right of privacy. The Constitution recognizes
that there are certain circumstances in which it is appropriate for
law enforcement to obtain information that an individual wants to
keep private: for example, when a judge finds probable cause to
believe that such information is *** evidence of a crime. Decisions
as to where that line should be drawn are political and legal ones,
not scientific or business ones; they should be made by the Congress, the Executive, and the courts, not by programmers or marketers. Policy should regulate technology; technology should not
regulate policy. Just as in the first part of the twentieth century,
when the law had to take account of the changes in society brought
about by the automobile, the law will have to take account of the
15
changes brought about by encryption.
Now, here I take it that the Department of Justice makes two
claims: (1) policy should drive technology and not the other way
around, and (2) the U.S. Constitution does not create an absolute right
to privacy. I agree with both of those claims. That may make me the
middle of the road on this panel, but I agree with both of those claims.
However, they go on to say "[c]ourt-authorized wire-taps have proven
to be one of the most successful law-enforcement tools" and that the
14. See Department of Justice FAQ on Encryption Policy, U.S. DEPAR-rMNT Op
(last modified Sept. 17, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/Cybercrime/

JUSTICE

cryptfaq.htm> [hereinafter Department of Justice FAQ].

15. Id. at Question 6.
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loss of those wiretaps would be just a disaster for law enforcement.1 6
As society is becoming increasingly reliant on wire communications,
they argue, law enforcement's need to access the contents of those
7
communications, in appropriate circumstances, has also increased.'
Then they go on to tell us by now somewhat-familiar stories about the
high-profile espionage, terrorists, and criminal cases where electronic
surveillance has detected groups that planned to do terrible things.' 8
One group by itself planned to bomb the U.N. building, the Lincoln
and Holland tunnels, the main federal building of New York City, and
also assassinate political figures, and all this was foiled just by one
little wiretap. 19 We are all better off for those successes I am sure, and
it is no doubt good to be reminded not to underestimate the potential
value of wiretaps.
Whether or not wiretaps are as essential to the work of law enforcement as the Department of Justice claims, I am probably not
competent to tell you for certain. I have to confess, though, to having
met enough people in law enforcement to suspect that they have the
resources to work around whatever limitations we might impose on
them, at least up to a point. So, my suspicion is things might not be
quite as dire as they say, but I cannot prove that to you. I think, therefore, that we need to accept, at least for the sake of the argument, that
all other things being equal, strong encryption will make law enforcement's job harder. Thus, law enforcement is going to have to spend
more money, or do less, or do things differently. Change is always
difficult, so there is a potential impediment to law enforcement here.
Now, the Department of Justice FAQ concludes that the world
would just be a better place if everyone volunteered to use some sort
of encryption system with government access to keys, which I will
call "GAK" for short. 20 It might be key escrow, key recovery, the
equivalent, whatever. The FAQ is careful to point out that the Justice
Department does not advocate a mandatory approach. 2 ' I might ask,
therefore, to what extent the Justice Department has been coordinating
with the FBI, because it seems fairly clear to me that the FBI comes
within about one hair of advocating a mandatory approach. When
asked, the FBI says, "Anything that is not a mandatory approach does
not satisfy our needs, and yes, things that are mandatory do satisfy our
16. Id. at Question 7.
17. See i

18. See id. at Question 8.
19. See id.
20. See generally idL at Question 13.

21. See id. at Question 15.
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needs. Of course, we are not advocating that because that would not
be in keeping with the Administration's policy." Those are very subtle Washington distinctions.
The Justice Department likes to keep this discussion hypothetical
and says that if faced with a hypothetical mandatory key escrow statute, it is the Justice Department's best judgment that a mandatory
plaintext recovery regime, if properly structured, could comport with
constitutional doctrine. 22 Here, I most emphatically disagree. 23 I
mentioned one of the reasons before, in the question and answer: I do
not read the Fourth Amendment as giving the federal government a
right to an effective search. The Fourth Amendment is structured so
that we have a basic right to be secure in our homes, et cetera. That
right has a derogation in that, in certain circumstances, the government, with a court order, can conduct a search. That does not create
any obligation on citizens who retain the sort of rights the Bill of
Rights is designed to protect, to say, "Here it is! Here is the incriminating stuff!" or "Yes, here, let me help you understand my documents." That is just not the way the Constitution is supposed to work.
Another thing that I think the Department of Justice really
glosses over in this FAQ is the way that reasonable expectations have
been used in the case law. A great deal of Fourth Amendment law is
based on some idea that a particular type of warrantless search is allowed because the person who is subjected to the search did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. If you go through the cases, it is
really quite an amazing catalog of circumstances under which we are
told we did not have reasonable expectations: planes flying low over
your house, the garbage in bags outside your curtilage, people standing on boxes to peek over high fences, people going inside fences with
"No Trespassing" signs, all kinds of stuff.2 4 In case after case, the socalled "drug exception" to the Constitution does its work, 25 and you
22. See id. at Questions 16 and 17.
23. See A. Michael Froomkin, The MetaphorIs the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip and the Constitution, 143 U. PEN,. L. REv. 709, 810-43 (1995) [hereinafter

Froomkin, Metaphor], available in <http://www'law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/

clipperl.htm>. See generally Froomkin, Planet Clipper, supra note 12.
24. See generally Laura B. Riley, Comment, Concealed Weapon Detectors and the
Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Remote Sense-Enhanced Searches, 45

UCLA L. REv. 281, 293-301 (1997); Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted
Physical Surveillance: The American Bar Association'sTentative Draft Standards, 10

HARv. J.L. & TECH. 383 (1997).
25. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL
NAL PROCEDURE, CASES AND COMMENTARY

J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMI-

285-88 (5th ed. 1996) ("If evidence will

be destroyed in the time it takes to obtain a warrant, then the warrant requirement is
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find that what you might have thought was a reasonable expectation of
privacy is not reasonable.
Now comes a technology that proposes to change one's expectation of what privacy is reasonable, but for once would increase expectations instead of decreasing them, and here is the Justice Department
saying, "No, no, we will design the system so that your expectations
do not get out of control, so you do not expect too much, and that will
be all right, because we will make what we are doing clear to you."
They are honest about this: "We will make it clear to you that you
must not expect too much, and you will not expect too much; it will be
a self-fulfilling prophecy, and we will have access to plaintext."
I do not see why technology should be a one-way ratchet to reduce expectations of privacy. If we are going to talk about the relationship between social policy and technology, and argue that policy,
not technology, should be the master, what are we to make of all this
sense-enhanced searching, aerial surveillance, and all the rest, where it
seems technology drove the policy? Why, all of a sudden, when a
technology is going to increase privacy, do we suddenly reverse field
and say technology must be limited? I do not get it. That may be
more a policy issue than a constitutional law issue, but it seems to me
a serious problem that ought to be considered.
The Department of Justice says that there are no Fifth Amendment issues in its hypothetical proposals. It argues that the advance
deposit of decryption information-especially if done by the manufacturer before the product ever gets into a person's hand-does not create Fifth Amendment problems since disclosure by the manufacturer is
neither compelled, testimonial, nor incriminating. Indeed, that is a
conclusion that pretty well tracks the way that the law has developed
in the past.26 It is certainly the case that, as designed, current policies
and current proposals, especially the House Intelligence Committee's
substitute amendment for the SAFE Bill, 27 very cleverly sidestep all
the Fifth Amendment issues by using technology. Why we should
design a policy to take advantage of the back door to the Fifth Amendment that technology provides for us is not clear to me. I do not think
that this is in keeping with the spirit of the Fifth Amendment, although
I would be willing to accept that it might be in keeping with the letter
of the law, as interpreted by prior precedent before the advances in
excused...

Not surprisingly, destruction of evidence issues often arise in drug

cases.").

26. See Froomkdn, Metaphor, supra note 23, at 836-38.
27. See Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, H.R. 695, 105th
Cong. (1997).
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technology. Those precedents, however, did not have these social circumstances in mind.
The Department of Justice also says that there are no First
Amendment issues. It identifies five types of First Amendment issues,
some of which are only straw men, and says none is applicable.
First, the Justice Department says that encrypted speech is not
like a foreign language because nobody "speaks" it without mechanical aids. "Ciphertext," the Department tells us,
is not like a foreign language, the use of which can convey unique
meaning and nuance to the listener or reader. Thus, ciphertext itself-as opposed to the underlying plain text-has none of the
properties of protected "speech" that the Supreme Court has traditionally identified, and, accordingly, the dissemination of ciphertext
28
should not be entitled to First Amendment protection.
I do not really see how that argument can be right. I am willing
to accept that ciphertext is not like a foreign language, but that seems
to me to be asking the wrong questions. Speaking into a telephone
turns speech into mechanical, digital, items that cannot be understood
without a mechanical aid, namely a telephone that unscrambles the
digital information into sounds. It has never been suggested that the
digitization of the sounds removes the content of that telephone communication from protected speech, so I just cannot understand how the
Department of Justice can make this argument. When one is playing
law professor, one can spin wonderful hypotheticals about people who
speak through prosthetic devices because they have lost their natural
speech functions, for example, signaling Morse code with devices that
track their eyebrows and whatnot, but we do not need to do that. Today, we are going to stick to the main things and avoid the straw men.
We come not to praise Caesar, but to bury him.
The second argument that the Department of Justice puts up and
knocks down is the claim that knowing the government is listening
would have an impermissible chilling effect. The Justice Department
points out, logically, that if this were the case then all wiretaps would
be unconstitutional. I think that that is probably right as far as it goes.
I am going to suggest to you, in my last couple of minutes, that the
context in which speech may be chilled might need to be evaluated in
the context of all the other things that are happening to people in society. Thus, the chilling effect problem might be larger when we do the
individualized balancing that might be required in any individual case;
but, as a rebuttal to a general proposition, the Justice Department is
28. Department of Justice FAQ, supra note 14, at Question 17.
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correct that a chilling effect argument cannot be the basis for a First
Amendment claim to a right to un-escrowed strong cryptography.
The third suggestion addressed is that some people say the distribution of object code is a protected First Amendment activity. At
least for the sake of the argument, I would be willing to concede that
here, the Department of Justice is correct, and that object code falls in
the "Widget" category, rather than the "Speech" category. I would be
willing to concede that, only for today, because it gets us to where we
are going.
That brings us to whether source code is protected speech and
whether its distribution is a protected First Amendment activity.
These are precisely the questions at issue in the Karn and Bernstein
cases, especially the Bernstein case. The Department of Justice's position on this is interestingly nuanced: "Some persons do disseminate
source code for communicative purposes. Nevertheless, we believe
that a restriction on the dissemination of certain encryption products
could be constitutional... because such a restriction could satisfy the
'intermediate' scrutiny that the First Amendment provides for incidental restrictions on communicative conduct." 2 9 To make a long story
short, while this has some elements of a close question, it does seem to
me that, at least in a non-commercial context the balance weighs
pretty clearly in favor of saying that source code is a form of protected
speech.3 0 In the Bernstein facts, where you have an academic who
wants to distribute work relating to his dissertation, it seems to me to
be pretty close to a core protected speech situation. I think that the
issue for a commercial product is somewhat tougher, but I do not think
that it is as close as the Department of Justice would like you to think
it is.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Department of Justice
says-and here I think it is an accurate statement of the law as it
stands today, but not, I hope, as it stands tomorrow-that there is not a
general constitutional right to encryption. It concludes from this fact
that, therefore, prohibition of the manufacture or distribution of
nonrecoverable encryption products would be okay. Legislation could
be drafted, the Department says, "as a permissible time, place, and
29. Id. at Question 17.
30. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145 (9th Cir.
1999) ("To the extent the government's efforts are aimed at interdicting the flow of
scientific ideas (whether expressed in source code or otherwise), as distinguished
from encryption products, these efforts [, specifically Export Administration Regulations,] would appear to strike deep into the heartland of the First Amendment."), opinion withdrazvn pending rehearingen banc, -

F.3d ._ (1999). arailablein No. 97-

16686, 1999 WL 782073 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 1999).
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manner restriction-particularly since any such restriction on the
'tools' of speech would be unrelated to any communicative impact of
the underlying plaintext." 3 1 Well this, it seems to me, really is the
fundamental issue because of the spillover effects on other parts of our
lives; and I think, in talking about this, while we can play technical
games and work through each of the individual constitutional amendments and find good arguments there as well, there is something to be
said for also hitting the issue head-on. It may be time to think about
deriving a new jurisprudence we might call, somewhat grandly, "the
new privacy," which I hope has echoes of "the new property," because
I think it is just as fundamental to our future as "the new property"
was in the period in which it developed.
Now, what would "the new privacy" look like? First off, it
would change the assumption that facts about us tend to be public
property. We would personalize ownership of facts about us in transactions, perhaps even sometimes in public, and we would try to use
the property regime and the intellectual property regime to take back
some control over personal data. The First Amendment imposes limits on the extent to which one can limit the appropriation of public
facts, so this is in no way a complete solution; but, it is a way, I think,
of dealing with this problem of how technical change affects social
policy if you do not confront it squarely.
Here are some of the technical changes that concern me, which I
think "new privacy" has to address. We have now an enormous
number of new techniques of high-tech searches, many of which do
not, apparently, require warrants. Courts in this country have held, for
example, that technologies which detect heat from a house can be used
without a warrant; indeed, if you find a lot of heat coming out of the
house, that is probable cause for a search because somebody must be
doing something inside they should not be doing. 3 2 If you find no
31. Department of Justice FAQ, supra note 14, at Question 17.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding
that aerial surveillance of occupied, private residence with infrared thermal detection
was not unconstitutional search), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1220 (1996); United States v.
Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that warrantless use of thermal
imager in "open field" does not violate Fourth Amendment because such use is passive and non-intrusive), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995); United States v. Myers, 46
F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that thermal imaging scanning is not "search"
within meaning of Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 879 (1995); United
States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated by government's warrantless use of forward looking infrared device
(FLIR) to detect differences in surface temperature of house because defendant's subjective expectation of privacy in heat emanating from his house was not one that
society would find objectively reasonable), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1057 (1994); La-
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heat coming out, that also is probable cause because they must be
using a lot of shielding. 33 Not every court has gone that way, 34 but
some have.
We have enormous possibilities for tracking and identifying people coming on-line-not just the things you may have seen in the
movies with Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 35 and cell phones, not
just data mining that allows a corporation to find all of your reading
and transacting on the Internet and correlate it to build up a profile
about you. We have DNA databases; 36 we have databases of addresses of people who have had brushes with the government, felony

convictions, or other things. We have the motor vehicle and DMV
databases, which can be cross-referenced with all of the above. 37 We
3
have child support databases; 38 we have databases about workers; 9
Follette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747,749 (Ky. 1996) (finding that use of FLIR
unit during overhead flight to survey dwelling's heat emissions did not constitute
search); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that use
of infrared sensing device to detect heat emanating from defendant's residence did not
constitute "search" within meaning of Fourth Amendment), rerien. denied, 515
N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 1994).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering absence of heat to be sign of suspiciously good insulation).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1533 (W.D. Wis. 1994)
(holding that use of thermal imager is search that does not fall into exception of warrant clause); People v. Deutsch, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 (CL App. 1996) (holding that
society has reasonable expectation that heat generated from within home may not be
measured without warrant); State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 192 (Mont. 1997) (thermal
imaging scan is search that implicates state constitutional right to privacy), overned
on other grounds by State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556 (Mont. 1998) (finding that overruling Siegal on standard of review of search warrant applications); Commonwealth v.
Gindlesperger, 706 A.2d 1216, 1223-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding warrantless
use of thermal imaging device unconstitutional search under Fourth Amendment), appeal granted, 724 A.2d 933 (Pa. 1998); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 604 (Wash.
1994) (holding that warrantless use of thermal imaging violates both Fourth Amendment and rights to privacy in Washington Constitution).
35. See, e.g., Joseph Rose, Satellite Offenders, WiRM (Jan. 13, 1999) <httpI/,w.
wired.com/news/news/technology/story/17296.html> (describing use of Global Positioning System technology to track probationers, prisoners on work release, and

others).
36. See Reno ProposesNational DNS Database,EPIC ALERT VOLUME 6.04 (Elec.
tronic Privacy Information Center, Washington, D.C.) (Mar. 4, 1999) <httpJ//,
epic.org./alert/EPICAlert_6.04.html> (noting that FBI Combined Index DNA Indexing System (CODIS) currently contains information on 38,000 people with another
450,000 samples awaiting processing).
37. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-716 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp.
1994)), prohibits the use of state drivers' licenses after October 1. 2000 unless they
contain Social Security numbers as the unique numeric identifier "that can be read
visually or by electronic means."
38. See Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Ntmuber: An Oven'iew of Legislation
and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as PersonalIdentifiers,
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we have databases about people who do not have proper immigration
status to be allowed to work, and so on and so on and so on.40 We
have all kinds of observation technology: keystroke monitoring 4' in
the workplace, cameras in public places, speed cameras that take pictures of license plates and that can be used to track an individual's
movement. 42 We have road pricing schemes, 43 which are designed
not only to debit an anonymous account, but also to keep track of the
car and, incidentally, how fast it was going as it goes from point to
point. Currently, in one neighborhood in England, the government is
doing an experiment where they are using facial recognition technologies along with cameras mounted on telephone poles. 44 (It happens to
be one of the poorest areas in the country-I wonder why they chose
that to be the place where they test this new social control
technology.)
16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER, 529, 546-47 (1998) (discussing federal statute that
requires creation of database containing names and social security numbers of all persons who owe or are owed child support).
39. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
part of the 1996 welfare reform, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2209 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 653a (Supp. 111 1994)), set up a "State Directory of New
Hires," under which employers are now required to send the government the name,
address and Social Security number of every new employee. See id. § 653a(b)(1)(A).
40. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2024 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(b)(1)
(Supp. I1 1994)), gives the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) the
power to create "unique health identifier[s]" so that the government can electronically
tag, track and monitor every citizen's personal medical records. See also Phyllis
Schlafly, Stealth Assault on Medical Records, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1998, at A19

(discussing contention that federal government plans to assign personal identification
number to every medical patient). The 1993 Comprehensive Child Immunization Act
would have authorized the HHS "to establish state registry systems to monitor the
immunization status of all children." S. 732, 103d Cong. § 2145 (1993).
41. See Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931,
942 (1996) ("[K]eystroke monitoring... tracks the user's every keystroke and the
computer's response. ... [It] indicate[s] who signed on, at what time, for how long,
and even the nature of their activities while logged on.").
42. See Controlling Speeds on Limited Access Highways: Surface Transportation
Safety Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Related Agencies of the House

Comm. on Appropriations,106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Brian O'Neill, President,
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety) ("[Speed cameras] photograph motor vehicles
going a specified amount above the posted speed limit, and violators are ticketed by
mail ..
The time, date, location, and speed of the vehicle are recorded on the
film.").
43. See generally Margaret M. Russell, Privacy and IVHS- A Diversity of Viewpoints, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 145 (1995) (examining differ-

ing views on Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems).
44. See Nick Taylor, Closed Circuit Television: The British Experience, 1999
STAN. TECH.

L. REv. VS 11 <http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLRlSymposialPrivacy/index.

htm>.
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In the United States, we have economic tracking capabilities,
which grow out of anti-money laundering projects 45 designed to combat various types of financial fraud or the use of money in other kinds
of transactions you do not like, especially drugs. We are looking at a
potential world-not that it is guaranteed to happen-where we are
going to be facing a new level of perfection in law enforcement. I see
Professor Moglen shaking his head because he thinks everyone vill
encrypt their way out of it. But that is, in fact, my point. My point is
that it is important to safeguard the countermeasures that people will
use. It is not my point that the government will have a perfect success
rate in stamping out those countermeasures. It is just going to make
life very unpleasant-and needlessly so-for lots of people as we
fight our way to the end. And, it is better to get to that end on the high
principle which it deserves, the principle that people are entitled to
private space. We should focus on the high principle that the United
States government should, as a matter of policy and decency and
human fights, encourage people to create private space for themselves
and help people to find the tools to do so. We should insist that this
right derives not only from the right of privacy, but also from the right
of freedom of association, and remind opponents that without these
rights and these tools everything you do is non-anonymous.
If you cannot be anonymous, then everything you do can potentially be tracked. 46 Furthermore, your right to private associational
activities in cyberspace, which are going to increasingly become indistinct from regular 'meeting space' activities, will be infringed if you
cannot use the Internet in real privacy. Every time you use a computer
to speak, to publish something, to chat with people, to transact, to read
something, if that is all becoming part of a dossier about you, that is
going to change your life in a way that I do not think it ought to be
changed. I think it is appropriate to invoke the Constitution to protect
a citizen's abilities to employ technical countermeasures against the
new technologies that are likely to be deployed against us all.

45. See Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information Age
Economy: Can We Handle Treasury'sNew Policy Tecinology?, 34 Juru.trmmcs J.
383, 386-91 (1994).
46. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean:
Living With Anonymity, Digital Cash, and DistributedDatabases, 15 U. Prrr. J.L. &
CoMM. 395 (1996), available in <http'/vww.law.miami.edu/-froomkinarticlesi
ocean.htm>.
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